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“Thus far the chief purpose of a military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose 
must be to avert them. It can have no other useful purpose.” – Bernard Brodie 
 
“General, I’ve fought just as many nuclear wars as you have.” – Alain Enthoven  
 
 
COURSE DESCRIPTION 
 
This course serves as an introduction to the study of nuclear security. Students are provided with the necessary 
background and knowledge base needed for understanding contemporary nuclear strategy and policy issues. 
How do nuclear weapons shape international politics? Why do some states build the bomb and not others? Is 
a world free of nuclear weapons really possible? What is the future of America’s nuclear alliances? Are the 
superpowers headed for another nuclear arms race? These are just some of the important questions covered in 
this course.  
 
 
COURSE OBJECTIVES 
 
By the end of the semester, students should have acquired knowledge and understanding of key concepts, 
theories, and debates involved in the study of historical and contemporary nuclear security issues. Students 
should also have developed the skills to analyze complex situations, synthesize information, and communicate 
effectively, both orally and in writing. 
 
COURSE FORMAT 
 
The course will run remotely, via a combination of asynchronous and synchronous Zoom sessions. Lectures 
will be run asynchronously, while discussion will be held synchronously each week during our assigned class 
time. Both types of class sessions – lectures and discussions – will be recorded and posted to Blackboard. More 
details will be provided during our first Zoom meeting, which will run synchronously on the scheduled date 
and time previously set by the Registrar. 
 
 
Readings: The syllabus differentiates between two types of readings: Required; and Optional (i.e. 
recommended but not required). Class discussion as well as all course evaluation methods are organized around 
the required readings and materials (e.g. films), only. The optional materials are just that. They are intended 
to serve as a guide for those wishing to delve deeper into the subject matter on their own (i.e. outside of class) 
time. All required readings have been posted to Blackboard. Some (but not all) of the optional readings can 
also be found on Blackboard. 
 
Audiovisual Materials: In addition to the required readings, students are expected to review the assigned 
audiovisual materials (e.g., audio recordings, videos, and games) before the class for which they are assigned. 
As with the readings, some of the audiovisual materials are required, while others are optional. Students are 
only expected to watch/listen/play those materials listed as required; not the optional ones. Links to these 
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materials can be found in the syllabus and/or on Blackboard. The 3 required films can be streamed via the links 
posted on Blackboard. For the best streaming quality, use the Chrome browser.  
 
DIPL 3120 Designated Library Research Page: Librarian Lisa DeLuca has designed a one-stop tool for all 
your DIPL 3120 research needs. It’s a wonderful resource, so please use it. You can access it here: 
https://library.shu.edu/DIPL3120  
 
COURSE REQUIREMENTS 
Participation (30%) – Students are required to do the assigned readings and watch the required films prior to 
each class so they can be prepared to talk about them during class discussion sessions. In addition, students are 
expected to follow contemporary nuclear security developments in the news (e.g. arms control, DPRK, Iran, 
etc.) 
  
Regular class participation (10%): Students are encouraged to participate in class discussions to the best of 
their ability and current circumstances. If your personal situation precludes you from participating in 
class discussions, please let me know (via email).   
 
Guest Speaker Participation Questions (10%): We will have three guest speakers over the course of the 
semester. For the weeks where we will have guest speakers (Weeks 2, 8, 11) students are required to 
submit 3 questions they would like the guest lecturer to answer. The questions can address either the 
weekly topic (e.g. arms control, NATO, etc.) OR aspects related to the guest speaker’s career path (e.g. 
What is the most difficult decision you have had to make in your career so far?). Each student must 
post their questions on the appropriate Blackboard page no later than the Tuesday (5:00 pm 
EST/EDT) of the week of the guest lecture. Late submissions will be graded down. NB: The best 
questions are those that are informed by the readings. As such, students are strongly encouraged to do 
the readings for that week before submitting their questions in writing to Prof. Moller.  
 
Guest Speaker Blog-Posts (10%) – Following each guest lecture, students will be responsible for posting 
short blog-posts (approx. 250 words) on Blackboard discussing what they learned from the guest 
speaker(s). The blog posts should be posted no later than 72 hours after the guest lecture. 
 
 
Quizzes (20%) – There will be two quizzes (each worth 10%). The first quiz will take place in Week 4; the 
second quiz will take place in Week 10. 
 
Policy Memo (50%) – Students will write two policy memos (each worth 25%) over the course of the semester. 
The first memo is due October 30, 2020; the second memo is due December 14, 2020. 
 
 
REQUIRED TEXT 
 
Lewis, Jeffrey. The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks Against the United State., New 
York, Houghton Mifflin, 2018. 
 
• Available at the campus bookstore and online (Kindle Price: $2.99; Paperback: $12), for purchase.  
 
All other required readings and materials for this course can be accessed via Blackboard or using the 
links provided in the syllabus. 
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COURSE PROCEDURES & POLICIES 
 
Accommodations. It is the policy and practice of Seton Hall University to promote inclusive learning 
environments. If you have a documented disability you may be eligible for reasonable accommodations in 
compliance with University policy, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 
and/or the New Jersey Law against Discrimination. Please note, students are not permitted to negotiate 
accommodations directly with professors. To request accommodations or assistance, please self-identify with 
the Office for Disability Support Services (DSS), Duffy Hall, Room 67 at the beginning of the semester. For 
more information or to register for services, contact DSS at (973) 313-6003 or by e-mail at DSS@shu.edu. 
 
Counseling. The Office of Counseling and Psychological Services (CAPS) offers assistance to students 
in need of support. CAPS is located in Mooney Hall and can be reached at (973) 761-9500. 
 
Absences. Students are expected to attend all class sessions and be on time, as well as participate in 
discussions. If a medical situation or other emergency arises students should inform the professor via email 
at the earliest possible opportunity as to the reason for their absence. Unexcused absences will bring down your 
participation grade.  
 
Athletes and Members of Other Student Groups. It is the responsibility of the student to contact the 
professor about any extracurricular activities that may impinge on their attendance or participation in the course. 
 
Late or Incomplete Assignments. Students who anticipate not being able to complete an assignment on time 
should inform me as soon as possible. Absent prior communication, failure to complete an assignment on its 
due date will result in a grade penalty. All late assignments will be penalized by one-third letter grade per day 
(i.e., an A assignment turned in one day late is an A-, two days late a B+, etc.) except in cases of medical/family 
emergency or COVID-related issues. See COVID Ground Rules. 
 
Incompletes. Incompletes will be given only in exceptional cases for emergencies. Students wishing to request 
a grade of Incomplete must provide documentation to support the request accompanied by a Course 
Adjustment Form (available from the Diplomacy Main Office) to the professor before the date of the final 
examination. If the incomplete request is approved, the professor reserves the right to specify the new 
submission date for all missing coursework. Students who fail to submit the missing course work within this 
time period will receive a failing grade for all missing coursework and a final grade based on all coursework 
assigned. Any Incomplete not resolved within one calendar year of receiving the Incomplete or by the time of 
graduation (whichever comes first) automatically becomes an “FI” (which is equivalent to an F). It is the 
responsibility of the student to make sure they have completed all course requirements within the timeframe 
allotted. Please be aware that Incompletes on your transcript will impact financial aid and academic standing. 
Easter Egg: As a reward for reading this far, I will add a point to your lowest quiz score if you send me an email 
with the name of a nuclear weapon in the US arsenal by 5:00 pm EDT on September 1, 2020.  
 
Extra Credit. There will be no opportunities for extra credit assignments in this course (other than the one 
hidden in this syllabus) so do not bother asking for them. If you are struggling in the course, PLEASE book an 
appointment using https://profmoller.youcanbook.me/ . Do not wait until the last week of the course to ask 
for help. See COVID Ground Rules. 
 
Grade Appeals. Grades in this course are not negotiable. If you believe a calculation error has been made in 
the grading of your assignment, you may make a formal appeal. All appeals should be made in writing and sent 
to the professor via email. 
 
Plagiarism, Cheating and Academic Integrity. Plagiarism and other forms of academic dishonesty will be 
reported to the administration, and may result in a lowered or failing grade for the course and up to possible 
dismissal from the School of Diplomacy.  See University and School standards for academic conduct here: 
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http://www.shu.edu/offices/student-life/community-standards/community-standards.cfm 
http://www.shu.edu/academics/diplomacy/academic-conduct.cfm. 
 
 
Email. Before emailing the professor, students should read the syllabus in its entirety. Often, the answer has 
already been provided for you. If you are unable to locate the answer to your question, you may send me an 
email. However, I reserve the right to respond to your email with the words: “Read the syllabus” (or a meme 
to that effect,) which indicates that the answer to your question is found in the syllabus.  
 
Additional Email Instructions:  
 
o Students should include the name of the course in the subject line of the email, e.g., Subject 
“DIPL 3120 AA (or AB): Question about Film.” Doing so will enable me to locate your email 
more quickly and, thus, respond more promptly.  
o Students should communicate professionally, avoiding informal salutations (e.g. “Hey Prof!”), 
casual language, and emoticons. Treat any communication as you would with your (future) 
employer. This is a professional relationship. Would you ask your boss to do X? If not, odds are 
you shouldn’t be asking me, either. That being said, we are living through a pandemic. See COVID 
Ground Rules.  
o Please keep your communications brief. Complicated questions or issues are best discussed during 
Zoom office hour appointments. 
o Remember your professor is human and (on occasion) sleeps, so it may take her a day to respond. 
 
 
Office Hours: Office hours will be conducted via Zoom. To book an appointment, go to 
https://profmoller.youcanbook.me/ . I have blocked out M-W 4:30-5:50 pm each week but if these slots fill 
up or you are unable to make one of these times, send me an email and we will work something out. You can 
reschedule and cancel appointments using this website, and it will also autogenerate a Zoom link for our 
meeting, so it should make all of our lives a little bit easier. 
 
Understanding what office hours are: Office hours are opportunities for you and the professor to discuss 
the material presented in class or other related interests you have. There are no lesson plans for these 
interactions; instead the onus is on you to come prepared with any questions or issues you might like to discuss. 
For more background on what to expect, see http://lsc.cornell.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/What-Are-
Office-Hours.pdf  
 
Understanding what professors do: Professors do much more than teach. If you’re curious about what 
professors do for a living, see: https://www.forbes.com/sites/marshallshepherd/2018/07/19/professors-
are-often-asked-what-do-you-teach-they-do-far-more/#4d3537ae1745 
   
COVID Ground Rules1: We’re in a global pandemic. These are scary times. If you tell me you are struggling, 
I am not going to judge you or think less of you. You do not owe me personal information about your health 
(mental or physical) or living circumstances (and, for your sake as well as mine, I would prefer if you not get 
into specifics). If you have to miss a class, need extra help, or more time on an assignment, JUST ASK. I will 
work with you. If I can’t help you, I usually know someone who can. There are LOTS of campus resources 
(both virtual and in-person) available; use them. So, let’s agree on some ground rules: I will try my best and you 
will try your best. I will cut you some slack, provided you communicate with me about your constraints. And 
expect you to cut me some slack, too.  
 
1 Hat tip to Chris Jones (Twitter: @ProfChrisMJones), Topeka, Kansas, and Ryan Briggs (@ryanbriggs), 
Guelph, Ontario. 
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Disclaimer. I reserve the right to make changes to the syllabus in the course of the semester. Students will be 
given ample warning of any changes.  
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COURSE SCHEDULE 
 
Week Date Topic 
1 August 27, 2020 Introduction and Course Overview 
& 
Library Session: Doing Research Virtually 
Guest Lecturer: Lisa Deluca2 
2 September 3, 2020 Nuclear Weapons 101: Science & Technology Primer 
Guest Lecturer: Alex Wellerstein3 
(DQs due Tuesday, September 1, 2020 @ 5:00 pm EDT) 
3 September 10, 
2020 
Early Nuclear History: From Manhattan to Hiroshima 
4 September 17, 
2020 
Race for the Hydrogen Bomb 
5 September 24, 
2020 
The Nuclear Revolution 
6 October 1, 2020 American and Soviet Approaches During the Early Cold War 
7 October 8, 2020 Nuclear Acquisition & Restraint 
8 October 15, 2020 Arms Control from a Practitioner’s Perspective 
Guest Lecturer: The Hon. Rose Gottemoeller4 
(DQs due Tuesday, October 13, 2020 @ 5:00 pm EDT) 
9 October 22, 2020 Theories of Extended Deterrence 
10 October 29, 2020 NATO Nuclear Planning and Strategy During the Cold War 
11 November 5, 2020 NATO Nuclear Planning and Strategy Today 
Guest Lecturer: Jessica Cox5 
(DQs due Tuesday, November 3, 2020 @ 5:00 pm EST) 
12 November 12, 
2020 
Command and Control 
13 November 19, 
2020 
A New Cold War? China, Russia, and U.S. nuclear strategy in the 21st century 
 
 
 
2 Social Sciences Librarian, Seton Hall University 
3 Assistant Professor, Stevens Institute, and creator of NUKEMAP  
4 Payne Distinguished Lecturer, Stanford University, and former Deputy Secretary General of NATO (2016-2019) 
5 Director, Nuclear Policy Directorate, NATO International Staff  
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Part I: Introduction and Basics of Nuclear Weapons 
 
 
Week 1: Course Introduction & Overview (August 27, 2020) [31 pages] 
 
Required 
 
Read:  
 
George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall 
Street Journal, January 4, 2007. [1] 
 
Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal “The Logic of Zero: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Affairs, 
87, no. 6: 80–95. [15] 
 
Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Zero? Why Not Nuclear Infinity?” The Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2011. [1] 
 
Thomas C. Schelling, “A World Without Nuclear Weapons?” Daedalus, vol. 138, no. 4 (2009): 124-129. [6] 
 
Elbridge Colby, “If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War,” Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec 2018): 25-32. [8] 
 
Watch:  
 
“Dr. Strangelove or: How I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb” (1964) [ 1:34:00 minutes] (On 
Blackboard)  
 
 
Optional 
 
Read: 
 
Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrman, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), pp. 235-258. (On Blackboard) 
 
Watch:  
 
Irwin Redlener, “How to survive a nuclear attack.” TED Talk. February 2008 [25:00 min] 
 
The Bomb (2015) [1:55:06 min] 
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Week 2: Nuclear Weapons 101: Science & Technology Primer (September 3, 2020) [TBD] 
 
Guest Lecturer: Dr. Alex Wellerstein, Stevens Institute of Technology 
  
 
Required 
 
Read:  
 
Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, "Nuclear Weapons and Materials,” Deadly 
Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (2005): 45-54.  [10] 
 
 
Alex Wellerstein, “Manhattan Project,” Encyclopedia of the History of Science (October 2019) [24] 
 
Excerpts from Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of 
Safety (Penguin Books, 2013), Part 2. [34] 
 
 
 
Play: 
 
Nuke Map @ https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/   
 
 
Optional 
 
Read:  
 
Charles Ferguson, Nuclear Energy: What Everyone Needs to Know (2011), pp. 7-14 and 19-28. (On Blackboard)  
 
Sean L. Malloy (2007) ‘The rules of civilized warfare’: Scientists, soldiers, civilians, and American nuclear 
targeting, 1940 – 1945, Journal of Strategic Studies, 30:3, 475-512. (On Blackboard) 
 
 
Watch:  
 
Matthew Bunn, “Nuclear 101: How Nuclear Weapons Work”  
Part 1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MnW7DxsJth0  [1:05:28 min] 
Part 2: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MnW7DxsJth0&t=35s [45:03 min] 
 
Matthew Bunn. 2013. “How nuclear weapons work, 1/2.” (Slides available here.)  
Matthew Bunn. 2013. “How nuclear weapons work, 2/2.” (Slides available here.)  
 
 
The Day After Trinity (1981) [1:28:41 min] 
 
 
 
Week 3: Early Nuclear History: From Manhattan to Hiroshima (September 10, 2020) [90 pages] 
 
Required 
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Read:  
 
Joseph Cirincione, Bomb scare: the history and future of nuclear weapons. (Columbia University Press, 2007), pp.1-13. 
[13] 
 
Robert Serber, The Los Alamos Primer (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 1-4, 33-38, 56-61, 
AND 77-83 (i.e., Frisch-Peierls Memorandum). Don’t worry about the equations; focus on the philosophical 
issues the Primer raises. [23] 
 
Paul Williams, “Race and the Manhattan Project,” in Race, Ethnicity and Nuclear War (UK: Liverpool Press, 2011), 
Chpt 6 [22] OR Vincent Intondi, “The Response to the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” in 
African Americans Against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2015), Chpt. 1. [20] 
 
Paul Fussell, “Thank God for the Atom Bomb.” The New Republic (August 1981). [14] 
 
Gar Alperovitz, “Hiroshima: Historians Reassess,” Foreign Policy, vol. 99 (1995): 15–34. [20] 
 
Listen: 
 
BBC Radio announcement of Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) (MP3, 552KB) 
 
Watch:  
 
(1) Hiroshima Nagasaki August 1945 (27:57) 
 
Warning: This film contains graphic footage of the devastation wrought by the atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and their inhabitants. Viewer discretion advised. 
 
(2) “The Fog of War” (2003)  
 
Lesson 4: Maximize Efficiency [00:30:50-00:39:30 min] 
 
Lesson 5: Proportionality should be a guideline in war [00:39:30-00:48:40 min] 
 
Lesson 9: In order to do good, you may have to engage in evil [1:25:10-1:29:25 min] 
 
 
Optional 
 
The "Smyth Report" is still one of the best surveys of the Manhattan Project available.  
 
• Smyth, Henry DeWolf.  Atomic Energy for Military Purposes: The Official Report on the Development of the 
Atomic Bomb under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-1945.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1945 available in .pdf format.  
 
F.G. Gosling, The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb DOE/MA-001 (Washington, D.C.: Department 
of Energy, 1999): https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/303853  
 
Robert Jay Lifton, Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima, pp. 13-56, 479-541. (On Blackboard) 
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John Hersey, Hiroshima (New York: Random House, 1985), pp. 1-152. **Warning: This is a tough one to get 
through. Skim as much as you’re able.**  (On Blackboard)  
 
Ward Wilson, "The winning weapon? Rethinking nuclear weapons in light of Hiroshima." International Security 
31, no. 4 (2007): 162-179.  
 
Barton Bernstein, “The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1 (1995), p. 135-152.  
 
Richard Frank, “Ending the Pacific War: Harry Truman and the Decision to Drop the Bomb,” Footnotes, April 
28, 2009.  
 
 
Week 4: Race for the Hydrogen Bomb (September 17, 2020) [67 pages] Quiz 1 
 
Required 
 
Read: 
 
Peter Galison and Barton Bernstein, “In Any Light: Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 
1952-1954,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1989), pp. 268-270, 276-281, 
285-295, and 340 (schematic) only; SKIM the rest. [20] 
 
Thomas Cochran, “A Brief History of the Soviet Bomb,” in Making the Russian Bomb from Stalin to Yeltsin, 
pp. 13-35. [22] 
 
David Holloway, “The Hydrogen Bomb” in Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-1956 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 295-319. [25] 
 
Watch: 
 
H-bomb “Ivy  Mike” (4:39 min) 
 
 
Optional 
 
Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.  
 
 
 
Part II: Nuclear Strategy during the Cold War 
Week 5: The Nuclear Revolution (September 24, 2020) [107 pages] 
Required 
Read:  
Robert Jervis, The meaning of the nuclear revolution: Statecraft and the prospect of Armageddon. (Cornell University 
Press, 1989), pp. 1-45. [45] 
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Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2020), pp. 1-30. [29] 
Brandon Rittenhouse Green, The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), pp. 9-42. [33] 
Watch:  
“The Fog of War” (2003) 
 Lesson 1: Empathize with your enemy [00:06:50-00:14:20 min] 
Lesson 2: Rationality will not save us [00:14:40-00:25:05 min] 
Lesson 11: You can’t change human nature [1:39:35-1:42:15 min] 
Optional 
Thomas Schelling, “The Manipulation of Risk.” Arms and Influence, pp. 92–125.  
David Rosenberg, The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960,” 
International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 3-71.  
 
Week 6: American and Soviet Approaches During the Early Cold War (October 1, 2020) [89 pages] 
Required 
Read: 
Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2012). [48]   
Escalation dominance and the escalation ladder: 3-15, 23-25, 37-51, 230-234 [38] 
Nuclear Thresholds: 94-97 [4] 
Crisis Damage Limitation: 153-154 [1] 
Bargaining: 200-205 [5] 
David Holloway, “Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War, 1945-1962” in The Cambridge History 
of the Cold War, pp. 376-397. [22] 
Robert S. McNamara, “Forty Years After 13 Days,” Arms Control Today, November 2002. 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_11/cubanmissile  [19] 
Optional 
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Elbridge Coby, “The United States and Discriminate Nuclear Options in the Cold War,” in On Limited Nuclear 
War in the 21st Century, eds. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner, (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2014), pp. 49 – 79.  
Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, (1960): 1-20. 
Rosemary Foot, “Nuclear coercion and the ending of the Korean conflict.” International Security 13, no. 3 
(1988): 92-112.  
Marc Trachtenberg, “The influence of nuclear weapons in the Cuban missile crisis.” International Security 10, 
no. 1 (1985): 137-163.  
Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, 
and Nuclear Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 38, 1-2 (2015): 38-73.  
 
Part III: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control 
Week 7: Nuclear Acquisition & Restraint: Why (and why not?) obtain the bomb? (October 8, 2020) 
[77 pages] 
Required 
Read:  
Joseph Cirincione, “Why States Want Nuclear Weapons – and Why They Don’t,” in Bomb Scare (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 47-83. [36] 
Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation norms: Why states choose nuclear restraint (University of Georgia Press, 2009), 
pp. 1-34. [33 pages]  
Nicholas Miller, “Nuclear Energy and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: How Worried Should We Be?” Policy 
Brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, November 2017. [8]  
Optional 
Read: 
Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International 
Security, vol. 21, no. 3 (1996-1997): 54–86. (On Blackboard)  
Thazha Varkey Paul, Power versus prudence: Why nations forgo nuclear weapons (McGill Queen's Press, 2000) pages 
3-14. 
J.W. de Villiers, Roger Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss, “Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, 
November/December 1993 (On Blackboard) 
Jacques Hymans, “Isotopes and Identity: Australia and the Nuclear Weapons Option, 1949- 1999,” 
Nonproliferation Review, vol. 7, no. 1 (2000): 1–23.  
 13 
Scott Sagan, “Nuclear Latency and Nuclear Proliferation,” in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: 
Volume 1, The Role of Theory, eds. William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
Security Studies, 2010), pp.80-101.  
Ariel Levite, "Never say never again: nuclear reversal revisited." International Security Vol 27 No. 3 (Winter 
2002/2003): 59-88.  
Matthew Fuhrmann, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” 
International Security, vol. 34, no. 1 (2009): 7–41.  
Sarah Kreps and Matthew Fuhrmann. "Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect 
Proliferation?" Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 2 (2011): 161-187.  
 
Week 8: Arms Control (October 15, 2020) - Guest Lecturer: The Hon. Rose Gottemoeller  
 
Required 
 
Read: 
 
Rose Gottemoeller, “U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Negotiations – A Short History,”  American 
Foreign Service Association, available here: http://www.afsa.org/us-russian-nuclear-arms-control-
negotiations-short-history [12] 
Rose Gottemoeller – Forthcoming (TBD) 
Avis Bohlen, “Arms Control During the Cold War,” Footnotes. May 15, 2009. [1] 
George Bunn, Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Russians, (Stanford University Press, 
1992): Chapter 4.  
Janne Nolan, “The INF Treaty,” in The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification, eds. Michael Krepon and Dan 
Caldwell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 355-397. [42] 
Kingston Reif, “As INF Treaty Falls, New START Teeters,” Arms Control Today 49, no. 2 (Mar 2019): 26-29. 
[3] 
Rebecca Davis-Gibbons, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: How Did We Get Here and What Does it Mean for the 
United States?” War on the Rocks. July 14, 2017. [10] 
Global Zero Action Plan, available here: https://www.globalzero.org/reaching-zero/ [2] 
 
Listen: 
KennanX Episode 2 “Nuclear Insecurity: Should New START Die?” January 2020 (w/ Rose Gottemoeller) 
[19:12:00 min] Available here: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/audio/kennanx-episode-2-nuclear-insecurity-
should-new-start-die  
  
Relevant Documents: 
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Non-Proliferation Treaty. Available here: https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text 
 
U.S. Department of State, “The INF Treaty.” Available here: https://2009-
2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm  
 
Daryl Kimball and Kingston Reif, “The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance,” 
August 2019: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty  
 
U.S. Department of State, “The New START Treaty.” Available here: https://www.state.gov/new-start/  
 
Kingston Reif, “New START at a Glance,” January 2020: 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NewSTART  
 
Optional 
Read:  
Matthew Fuhrmann and Yonatan Lupu, “Do Arms Control Treaties Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.” International Studies Quarterly 60 (2016): 530-539. (On Blackboard) 
Carole Fink, “Détente” in Cold War: An International History, Boulder, CO: Westview Press (2014). (On 
Blackboard) 
George Bunn, "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems." Arms Control Today 33, 
no. 10 (2003): 4. (On Blackboard) 
Nicholas Miller, "The secret success of nonproliferation sanctions." International Organization 68, no. 4 (2014): 
913-944. (On Blackboard) 
Listen:  
Annika Thunborg, “History of Nuclear Testing,” podcast available for free on ITunes: 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/itunes-u/ctbt-introductory-course/id522629812?mt=10   
Jaap Ramaker, “Shaping of the Treaty: Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” podcast available for free 
on ITunes: https://itunes.apple.com/au/itunes-u/ctbt-introductory-course/id522629812?mt=10  
 
Part IV: Extended Deterrence 
Week 9: Theories of Extended Deterrence (October 22, 2020) [48 pages] 
Required 
Read: 
Bruce Russett, “Deterrence with Nuclear Weapons: How Necessary, How Acceptable?” The Review of Politics, 
50, No. 2 (Spring, 1988): 282-302. [20] 
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Neil Narang and Rupal Mehta, “The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence: Moral Hazard in a 
Nuclear Client State,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 1 (2019): 218-225; 234-238. [11] 
Paul Huth, "Extended deterrence and the outbreak of war." American Political Science Review 82, no. 2 (1988): 
423-440. [17] 
 
 
Optional 
Gene Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany’s 
Nuclear Ambitions,” International Security, 39, 4 (Spring 2015): 91-129.  
Paul Huth, “The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 2 (June 
1990): 270-290. 
Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st century, pp. 197-234.  
David Yost, “Assurance and Extended Deterrence in NATO,” International Affairs 85, no. 4 (2009): 755-780. 
(On Blackboard) 
 
Week 10: NATO Nuclear Planning and Strategy During the Cold War (October 29, 2020) [89 pages] 
Quiz 2 
Required 
Read:  
Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A crisis of credibility, 1966-1967 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996), pp. 1-24. [24]  
“The Soviet War Scare” President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (February 15, 1990), pp. v-xii; SKIM 
65-76. [18] 
Zachary Keck, “The Soviet Union’s Insane Plan to Crush NATO in Battle,” The National Interest, July 17, 
2015: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-soviet-unions-insane-plan-crush-nato-battle-13355 [10] 
Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long, “The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late 
Cold War Strategic Balance,” Security Studies, vol. 26, no. 4 (2017): 606–641. [37] 
 
Optional 
Read:  
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Herman Kahn, On Escalation, pp. 260-9. [10 pages]  
Wilfrid Kohl, “Nuclear Sharing in NATO and the Multilateral Force,” Political Science Quarterly 80, no. 1 (Mar., 
1965): 88-109. [22 pages] (On Blackboard) 
Lawrence Freedman and Jeff Michaels, “A NATO Nuclear Force” in The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 361-
377. [17 pages] (On Blackboard) 
John J. Mearsheimer, “Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe,” International Security 9, 3 (1984-85): 20-
46. (On Blackboard) 
Barry Posen, “Escalation and NATO’s Northern Flank,” in Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear 
Risks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 129-158.  (On Blackboard) 
Colin Gray and Keith Payne, “Victory is Possible,” Foreign Policy, vol. 39 (1980), pp. 14–27. [13 pages] (On 
Blackboard) 
 
Week 11: NATO Nuclear Planning and Strategy Today (November 5, 2020) [42 pages] 
Required 
Read:  
Jens Stoltenberg, “Germany’s support for nuclear sharing is vital to protect peace and freedom,” Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, May 11, 2020. [2] 
Michael Ruehle, “NATO’s nuclear deterrence: more important, yet more contested,” NDC Policy Brief 2-19 
(February 2019). [4] 
 
Jessica Cox, “Nuclear deterrence today,” NATO Review, June 8, 2020. [4] 
Jessica Cox, 2020. “Introduction” in Recalibrating NATO Nuclear Policy, NDC Research Paper, No. 10 (June 
2020), pp. 1-4. [4] 
Katarzyna Kubiak, “NATO’s nuclear response to the INF Treaty Violation,” in Recalibrating NATO Nuclear 
Policy, NDC Research Paper, No. 10 (June 2020), pp. 13-20. [7] 
Matthew Kroenig, “Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War,” Survival, Vol. 57, No. 1 
(February/March 2015), pp. 49-70. [21] 
Watch: 
“Online Briefing on NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence,” RUSI, June 16, 2020. (1:08:19) 
 
Part V: Contemporary Nuclear Challenges 
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Week 12: Command and Control (November 12, 2020) [270 pages*] 
Required 
Read:  
Jeffrey Lewis, The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks Against the United States: A 
Speculative Novel (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018). 
*Don’t get scared off by the page count; this is a fast (yet scary) read. 
 
Watch:  
 
“The Day After”* (1983)  
*Warning: Viewer Discretion Advised. 
Play:  
Download (FREE) and play Hair Trigger. Available here.  
 
Optional 
Read: 
Bruce Blair, “Strengthening Checks on Presidential Nuclear Launch Authority,” Arms Control Today (Jan./Feb 
2018).  
 
Rebecca Hersman, “When Should the President Use Nuclear Weapons?” War on the Rocks, August 14, 2017, 
https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/when-should-the-president-usenuclear-weapons/ 
 
Eric Schlosser, Command and control: Nuclear weapons, the Damascus accident, and the illusion of safety. Penguin, 2013. 
Especially Pp. “Not Good,” 3-17, “Decapitation,” 245-265, “Abnormal Environment,” 307-334. 
 
Peter Feaver, "Command and control in emerging nuclear nations." International Security 17, no. 3 (1992): 160-
187.  
 
Department of Defense. “Narrative Summaries of Incidents Involving Nuclear Weapons.” Washington D.C.: 
2010.  
 
 
 
Week 13. A New Cold War? China, Russia, and US nuclear strategy in the 21st century (November 19, 
2020) [111 pages] 
Required 
Read:  
 
Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press 
(2016), pp. 1-10, 240-251, 267-271. [26] 
 
Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, The Myth of The Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age, pp. 31-65. [34] 
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Dmitry Adamsky, Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy: Religion, Politics, and Strategy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2019), pp. 6-13, 208-217, 234-241. [23] 
Yao Yunzhu. “China’s Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence.” Air and Space Power Journal 24, 1 (2010): 27–30. [4] 
Li Bin, “Differences between Chinese and U.S. Nuclear Thinking and Their Origins,” in Understanding Chinese 
Nuclear Thinking, eds. Li Bin and Tong Zhao (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2016), pp. 9-15. [7] 
 
Gregory Kulacki, “Nuclear Weapons in U.S.-China Relations,” in Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking, pp. 
251-261. [12] 
 
Tong Zhao, “Changes in and the Evolution of China’s Nuclear Thinking,” in Understanding Chinese Nuclear 
Thinking, pp. 267-271. [5] 
 
 
Listen: 
 
“Russian Nuclear Doctrine and Escalation.” 2018. Arms Control Wonk Podcast, available here: 
https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1205000/russian-nuclear-doctrine-and-escalation/ [30 minutes] 
 
 
Optional 
Read:  
United States Department of Defense. 2018. Nuclear Posture Review.  
John Mueller, "The essential irrelevance of nuclear weapons: Stability in the postwar world." International 
Security 13, no. 2 (1988): 55-79. 
Jeffrey Lewis. “Minimum Deterrence.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64, no. 3 (2008): 38–41.  
Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China go nuclear? Assessing the risk of Chinese nuclear escalation in a 
conventional war with the United States,” International Security 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 50-92. (On Blackboard)  
M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros. 2010. “China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of 
Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure.” International Security 35(2): 48–87. (On Blackboard) 
Elbridge Colby, “Welcome to China and America’s Nuclear Nightmare,” The National Interest 
(January/February 2015).  
Zhenqiang Pan, “A Study of China’s No-First-Use Policy on Nuclear Weapons,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear 
Disarmament 1, no. 1 (2018): 115-136. (On Blackboard) 
 
No Class – Dec. 3, 2020 – Work on Memo 2 
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ADDITIONAL RESOURCES  
(Available on the DIPL 3120 Library Page) 
 
Frank Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2012).  (E-book available at Walsh Library) 
Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Status of World Nuclear Forces”, Federation of American Scientists, April 
2020: https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/  
Manhattan Project – Interactive website: https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-
history/Resources/library.htm 
 
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Nuclear Weapons Primer: 
https://www.wisconsinproject.org/nuclear-weapons/  
 
Footage of historical weapons and nuclear weapons effects: 
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Movies/index.shtml 
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Assignments 
 
Policy Memo # 1  
 
Instructions: Using the template provided (see Blackboard), write a decision memo addressing the prompt 
below. Your memo should be single-spaced; use Times New Roman size 12 font; include page numbers, and 
footnotes formatted according to the Chicago Manual of Style (again, see Blackboard).  
 
Page Limit: 3 pages 
 
Your memo is due by 5:00 pm EDT on October 30, 2020. Please upload your memo as a MICROSOFT 
WORD DOCUMENT using Safe Assign on Blackboard. 
 
Prompt: It is July 15, 1945. President Truman has asked you to prepare a decision memo for him discussing 
whether – as well as where (i.e. what kind of target) and how (i.e. whether to give the enemy advance warning, 
etc.) – to use the gadget.   
 
To assist you in this task, your aide has provided you with some background materials in the form of three 
documents (see below). Using these materials, make a recommendation to the president.   
 
Documents for Policy Memo 1: 
Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, “Memorandum of Conversation with General Marshal May 
29, 1945 – 11:45 p.m.,” Top Secret [3 pages] 
Source: Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence 
of Secretary of War Stimson (“Safe File”), July 1940-September 1945, box 12, S-1  
“Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting Thursday, 31 May 1945, 10:00 A.M. to 1:15 P.M. – 2:15 P.M. 
to 4:15 P.M., ” n.d., Top Secret [17 pages] 
Source: RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. 100 
Memorandum from Arthur B. Compton to the Secretary of War, enclosing “Memorandum on `Political 
and Social Problems,’ from Members of the `Metallurgical Laboratory’ of the University of Chicago,” June 
12, 1945, Secret [18 pages] 
Source: RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. 76  
 
Additional documents can be found here: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb525-The-Atomic-
Bomb-and-the-End-of-World-War-II/  
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Policy Memo # 2 
 
Instructions: Using the template provided (see Blackboard), write a decision memo addressing the prompt 
below. Your memo should be single-spaced; use Times New Roman size 12 font; include page numbers, and 
footnotes formatted according to the Chicago Manual of Style (again, see Blackboard).  
 
Page Limit: 3 pages 
 
Your memo is due by 5:00 pm EST on December 14, 2020. Please upload your memo as a MICROSOFT 
WORD DOCUMENT using Safe Assign on Blackboard. 
 
Prompt: It is December 2020. The president/president-elect has asked you to prepare a decision memo for 
him on the status of the New START Treaty negotiations and U.S. options. To assist you in advising the 
president/president-elect on U.S. arms control efforts, your aide has provided you with some background 
materials (see below). Using these materials, make a recommendation to the president on the way forward. 
 
Documents for Policy Memo 2: 
 
Amy Woolf, “The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions,” Congressional Research 
Services, June 10, 2020. [47 pages] 
 
James Timbie, “A Way Forward,” Daedalus 149, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 190-204. [15 pages]  
 
Testimony of the Honorable Thomas Countryman, “Russia and Arms Control: Extending New Start or 
Starting Over?” House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, 
July 25, 2019. [10 pages] 
 
 
